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Noises, similarities between words, slips of the tongue, ambiguities, wrong or false beliefs, 
lexical deficits, inappropriate inferences, cognitive overload, non-shared knowledge, topic 
organisation or focusing problems, among others, may cause misunderstanding. While 
some of these are structural factors, others pertain to the speaker or to both the speaker and 
the hearer. In addition to stable factors connected with the interlocutors’ communicative 
abilities, cultural knowledge or patterns of thinking, other less stable factors, such as their 
personal relationships, psychological states or actions motivated by physiological 
functions, may also result in communicative problems. This paper considers a series of 
further factors that may eventually lead to misunderstanding, and which solely pertain to 
the hearer: processing strategy, confirmation bias and weak vigilance. 
 






Communication is sometimes impinged by a frequent and ubiquitous 
phenomenon in intracultural and intercultural contexts: misunderstanding 
(Weigand, 1999; Blum-Kulka and Weizman, 2003). Often perceived as 
disruptive, it is basically manifested by interlocutors’ failure to understand each 
other due to the characteristics of their language or their performance 
(Bazzanella and Damiano, 1999; Dascal, 1999). Stable factors, such as cultural 
knowledge or ways of thinking, and less stable ones, like relationships, 
psychological states or physiological actions, may impede the speaker’s 1 
performance (Mustajoki, 2012). Consequently, hearers may arrive at unwanted 
interpretations, although they may also misinterpret because of errors in the 
inferential tasks in comprehension (Yus Ramos, 1999a, 1999b).  
                                                          
1  The feminine third person singular pronoun will refer to the speaker, while the masculine one 
will refer to the hearer. 
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This paper expands on those stable and unstable factors by showing that they 
may also influence processing and cause misinterpretation. Drawing from work 
on different types of misunderstanding (Yus Ramos, 1999a, 1999b), this paper 
thus aims to complement Mustajoki’s (2012) work, which focuses exclusively 
on speakers, and offer a holistic treatment of misunderstanding (Kecskes, 2010: 
51). Furthermore, this paper also delves into additional cognitive factors that 
make hearers regard erroneous interpretations as acceptable: (i) processing 
strategy deployed, (ii) propensity to rely on seemingly correct and effortless 
output of cognitive tasks, and (iii) lack of alertness to possible false beliefs or 
mistakes in such tasks. In addition to optimal relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 
1986/1995), these factors are argued to play a crucial role when opting for 
particular interpretations. These factors, furthermore, do not solely affect either 
intracultural or intercultural encounters, but communication in general; indeed, 
any conversation may be considered intercultural to the extent that the agents 
involved do not exactly share the same cultural background (Thomas, 1983; 
Sperber, 1996). 
This paper starts by reviewing the nature, types and origins of 
misunderstanding. Since its disruptiveness may eventually separate interlocutors 
from an ideal of successful communication, this is next described through the 
machinery of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995; Wilson and 
Sperber, 2002, 2004). Then, an analysis is made of how the factors affecting 
speakers’ performance, as discussed by Mustajoki (2012), may also hamper 
hearers’ interpretation. This is followed by a presentation of the additional 
hearer-related factors causing assignation of plausibility to wrong 
interpretations. Finally, some suggestions for future research are given. 
 
 
2. Understanding misunderstanding 
 
Misunderstanding stems from a discrepancy between the meaning that the 
speaker envisages for a particular utterance or fragment and what the hearer 
actually interprets (Bazzanella and Damiano, 1999; Ryan and Barnard, 2009). 
As a result, the hearer’s mental states are not modified as expected (Bosco et al., 
2006: 1403) and the hearer, in turn, attributes non-occurrent intentions, 
misconceives actions or even changes his interactive patterns (Banks et al., 
1991: 106).  
Often alluded to through labels like pragmatic failure (Thomas, 1983) or 
misfit (Weigand, 1999: 763), misunderstanding is normally included under the 
broader category of miscommunication (Gass and Varonis, 1991). However, this 
noticeable difficulty in communication must be distinguished from other 
phenomena:  
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- non-hearing, or not perceiving the acoustic signal (Grimshaw, 1980: 
45); 
- mishearing, or perceiving and interpreting the acoustic signal and 
thinking that this is done correctly (Grimshaw, 1980: 51; Mustajoki, 
2012: 232); 
- spurious non-hearing, or overtly or covertly and evasively faking not to 
have heard for varied reasons – e.g. avoiding interpersonal conflict – 
(Grimshaw, 1980: 58; Mustajoki, 2012: 231-232), and 
- non-/partial/ambiguous understanding, or incomplete understanding – 
i.e. getting the gist – and clearly indicating that this is the case (Ryan 
and Barnard, 2009: 47), because of being engrossed in comprehension 
of preceding discourse or in another activity (Brown, 1995: 34). 
 
Misunderstanding is a completely distinct phenomenon originating in 
comprehension troubles at the explicit or implicit level of communication (Gass 
and Varonis, 1991; Weigand, 1999: 764; Yus Ramos, 1999a, 1999b). It may 
overtly surface in conversations, be latent or even fully covert and go unnoticed 
(Hinnenkamp, 2003: 61-65). Since it falls within the processing side, it has 
a cognitive nature and pertains to the hearer, who is unaware of not having 
understood correctly (Weigand, 1999: 769-770; Ryan and Barnard, 2009: 47). Its 
involuntariness differentiates it from other cases of miscommunication such as 
deliberate baffling or confusion for the sake of manipulation or deception (Banks 
et al., 1991: 106), creating solidarity (Weizman, 1999), acquiring, modifying, 
expanding or coordinating knowledge (House et al., 2003: 2), or gaining prestige 
by means of language play (Hinnenkamp, 2003: 70-71). 
The responsibility for misunderstanding, however, cannot be solely attributed 
to the hearer: on many occasions participants are co-responsible, as they jointly 
co-construct it through their reactions to what is said when negotiating meaning 
(Codó Olsina, 2002: 39). Speakers and hearers are equal participants in 
communication inasmuch as they have to produce language and comprehend it 
(Kecskes, 2010: 51). Therefore, the speaker’s share is underscored in some 
taxonomies. For instance, Dua (1990: 115-119) distinguishes speaker-based 
misunderstanding, which is due to problems to conceptualise intentions, 
failure to express them properly or avoidance of expression of intentions for 
social reasons, and hearer-based misunderstanding, which encompasses non-
/partial hearing, mishearing and non-/partial understanding. Likewise, Banks 
et al. (1991: 106) differentiate misstatement, which is caused by expressive 
mistakes, from misinterpretation, which arises from interpretive errors. 
Apparent expressive infelicities may be motivated by (differing) cultural 
knowledge, the speaker’s cognitive system, 2  social relations, emotional or 
psychological states and the contextual information available to her 
                                                          
2  This refers to how individuals usually solve problems, think, perceive and remember 
(Allport, 1937). 
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(Mustajoki, 2012; more on this below). 
Other taxonomies, on the contrary, centre on the causes of misunderstanding. 
Weigand (1999: 774-781) singles out misunderstandings stemming from flaws in 
the communicative means – i.e. phonology, lexicon and syntax (linguistic 
means); gestures (perceptual means), and inferences (cognitive means) – and 
purpose misunderstandings, which result from failure to understand the 
predicative function – what words mean – the referential function – what is 
talked about – or the action function – the action accomplished. From a 
cognitive-pragmatic angle, Bosco et al. (2006: 1404-1405) similarly identify 
three major causes:  
 
a. failure of expressive act, or mistaking utterance value;  
b. failure of actor’s meaning, or distinct construal of the speaker’s intentions, and  
c. failure of communicative effect, or undue modification of the hearer’s mental 
states and rejection to engage in some activity.  
 
Lack of coherence (Verdonik, 2010: 1370), vagueness and ambiguity (Ardissono 
et al., 1998; Keysar and Henly, 2002; Jucker et al., 2003; Keysar, 2007; Shintel 
and Keysar, 2009), and unattainable explicitness (Dascal, 1999: 755; Ferreira et 
al., 2005; Verdonik, 2010: 1368-1375) also feature as conspicuous causes. In 
intracultural and intercultural communication, diverse cultural information 
undoubtedly also plays a major role (Banks et al., 1991; Tannen, 1991, 1992, 
1994; Zamborlin, 2007). The manifold causes of misunderstanding may be 
divided into (Bazzanella and Damiano, 1999: 820-821): 
 
a. Structural factors: disturbances in the channel (e.g. noises), similarities between 
linguistic elements or troubles caused by a foreign language. 
b. Factors related to the speaker, which include local ones, like slips of the tongue, 
misconceptions or ambiguous forms, and global ones, which are contingent on 
how she structures and presents information. 
c. Factors related to the hearer: knowledge problems (e.g. false beliefs, gaps in 
belief box, lexical deficits) and faults in cognitive processes (e.g. wrong 
inferences, cognitive overload). 
d. Factors related to both interlocutors: non-shared knowledge, topic organisation 
or focusing problems. 
 
Undeniably, misunderstanding unveils problematic, troubled or strained 
communication where interlocutors, momentarily or more persistently, drift 
apart from the joint endeavour of mutual understanding (Dascal, 1999; Weigand, 
1999). This is essential for communication to succeed in both intracultural and 
intercultural contexts, as efficient transmission of intended messages and correct 
comprehension are crucial. 
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3. Successful communication 
 
Communication is a circular process wherein a minimum of two agents 
continuously interchange roles as conversations unfold (Brown, 1995; 
Mustajoki, 2012: 219). The speaker may be characterised by benevolence, or 
sincerity, and competence, or adequate command of the grammar of her 
language and its norms of usage (Sperber, 1994). When engaging in a 
conversation, the speaker makes it clear that she has something to say and wants 
the hearer to be aware of it. Therefore, she has two intentions (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1986/1995: 58, 2015: 139): 
 
a. An informative intention, or willingness to make manifest to a hearer or audience 
a series of assumptions or propositions amounting to a particular message. 
b. A communicative intention, or purporting to make manifest that she indeed has 
that very message to communicate. 
 
The speaker gives indirect evidence of her more or less full-fledged informative 
intention by means of utterances, which are intentional stimuli that draw the 
hearer’s attention. Communication succeeds if the hearer arrives at the intended 
message by forging an adequate mental representation – i.e. by means of 
metarepresentation (Wilson, 1999; Sperber, 2000) – of the speaker’s informative 
intention. 
However, speakers are not sometimes fully conscious of all the thoughts or 
beliefs they entertain; they may have impressions or arrays of propositions that 
become manifest and may affect inferential processes (Sperber and Wilson, 
2015: 135-138), so they cannot express them with precision. On other occasions, 
speakers lack, do not use or cannot think of the appropriate expressions to 
communicate messages in a precise manner. Moreover, their language may lack 
the necessary expressive means enabling them to communicate successfully. 
Indeed, there may always be “[…] many more meanings than words and 
expressions in any language” (Mustajoki, 2012: 221). Therefore, utterances may 
only vaguely unveil intended messages, what speakers intend to do with their 
words or their feelings and/or attitudes to something (including messages) or to 
other people (including addressees). Utterances are not but sketchy plans for 
making manifest informative intentions and roughly approximate to the 
speaker’s thoughts (Jucker et al., 2003: 1742).  
Successful communication highly depends on an adequate match between 
informative intention and the utterance employed to make it manifest 
(Mustajoki, 2012: 231). Correct understanding, in turn, requires that the hearer 
constructs a proposition that accurately captures the speaker’s informative 
intention, which involves making the types of inferences the speaker intends 
(Sperber and Wilson, 2015: 147). Reduplication of thoughts is virtually 
impossible because of differences in conceptual repertoires and the 
encyclopaedic information attached and/or experience of feelings. What the 
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hearer must form is a mental representation that is similar enough to the one the 
speaker entertains. Forming that representation depends on decoding, inference 
and mindreading, which are jointly put to work in a process of mutual parallel 
adjustment (Carston, 2002; Wilson and Sperber, 2002, 2004).  
Mutual parallel adjustment yields an interpretative hypothesis, which may or 
may not correspond to the speaker’s informative intention. The effort this 
process requires is normally offset by cognitive effects (Sperber and Wilson, 
1995: 260). When the balance effort-effects is satisfactory, a hypothesis is 
optimally relevant (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 210). Hearers usually presuppose 
that speakers will aim for the most adequate effort-effect balance depending on 
their abilities – i.e. competence, the skills underlying performance – and 
preferences – i.e. the goals pursued (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 270; Mazzarella, 
2013: 33-35). Although there always is information, or ways to dispense it, 
which hearers might consider less effort-demanding and more effect-yielding, 
they must assume that speakers choose the best formulation possible to make 
their informative intention manifest. 
Expectations of optimal relevance pervade mutual parallel adjustment, so 
interpretative hypotheses are formulated through the path of least effort and 
maximum effects possible (Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Sperber, 2002, 2004). 
This amounts to deploying an easy and simple cognitive strategy (Padilla Cruz, 
2012): naïve optimism, whereby hearers assume speakers’ benevolence and 
competence (Sperber, 1994; more on this below). Upon finding an interpretative 
hypothesis satisfying their expectations of relevance, hearers may conclude that 
it is the message the speaker intended to communicate.  
Mismatch between informative intention and utterance, inability to find 
optimally relevant interpretations, mistakes in mutual parallel adjustment or 
accepting interpretative hypotheses which, despite optimal relevance, do not 
correspond to actual speaker’s informative intention may make communication 
fail in both intracultural and intercultural contexts. Any of these may happen 
because of a series of factors (Mustajoki, 2012), whose impact on both 
interlocutors is discussed in the following section.  
 
 
4. Causes of misunderstanding 
 
Successful intracultural and intercultural communication depends on the 
interlocutors’ performance, which is determined by their communicative 
abilities. These, in turn, may be affected by temporary or enduring intellectual 
and emotional dispositions, as well as by external variables of a social nature 
and/or actions motivated by physiological functions (Mustajoki, 2012: 223-224).  
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4.1. Stable causes 
 
4.1.1. Communicative abilities 
Producing grammatically correct and pragmatically appropriate utterances and 
interpreting them satisfactorily is the crux of communication. This ability is 
often referred to as communicative competence (Hymes, 1972) and rests 
squarely on a set of intertwined sub-competences: mastery of the code 
(grammatical/linguistic competence), capacity to arrange elements coherently 
and cohesively (discourse competence), knowledge of sociocultural rules of 
usage (sociolinguistic/sociocultural competence), command of ways to associate 
intentions to utterances (actional competence) and control of diverse 
communicative strategies (strategic competence) (Canale, 1983; Bachman, 
1990; Celce-Murcia et al., 1995). Exposure to language and interaction result in 
the internalisation and progressive sophistication of this toolkit enabling 
individuals to create linguistic expressions anew despite the limited inventories 
of languages and to understand them correctly (Kecskes, 2004, 2007). 
Communicative competence, however, does not automatically involve 
constantly adequate performance. Competence is comparative and gradual: 
individuals may be more or less competent than others or have a particular sub-
competence that is either more or less developed. It is also temporary due to 
variation on specific occasions. Incompetence may be occasional and surface in 
errors like slips of the tongue (Thomas, 1983), but it may also be more 
persistent, as in the case of non-native speakers or learners of a second language 
(L2). In addition to insufficient command of grammar and a ‘broken’ accent – 
which, depending on their interlocutors’ condescendence, may hinder 
understanding – non-native speakers often have lexical lacunae, lack the 
appropriate formulae to accomplish some speech acts (Bardovi-Harlig, 2002), 
translate directly from their native language or resort to weird or puzzling, albeit 
innovative, formulae. Furthermore, despite familiarity with adequate target 
language strategies, non-native speakers may not control them, and may employ 
them at the erroneous moment, with the wrong interlocutor or in the incorrect 
place (Bialystok, 1993). 
Linguistic deficits or improper expressive tools may prevent speakers from 
making manifest their actual informative intention straightforwardly and 
effortlessly. Selection of inadequate words to name objects (1), erroneous 
expressions to refer to preceding discourse elements (2), wrong deictics to locate 
objects spatially and/or temporarily (3), and mispronunciation (4) may all cause 
the hearer to construct alternative explicatures (Yus Ramos, 1999a, 1999b):  
 
(1)  [Said by a Spanish learner of English]: They are building a very, very large scratch-sky 
in Seville. [‘sky-scraper’ in Spanish is ‘rascacielos’, a compound consisting of ‘rascar’ 
(‘scratch’) and ‘cielos’ (‘sky’)] 
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(2)  [Said by a Spanish learner of English]: And Peter saw the mosquito on the wall. Tom 
was going to use her slipper to kill him but taked the spray and finally killed him [the 
italicised pronouns were used to refer back to Peter and the mosquito]. 
(3)  Give me this on top of there! [Give me that one over there!] 
(4)  A: Well, my son is [ɔːˈtɪstɪk] [= autistic] 
B: Congratulations! [Having understood ‘artistic’] (From Wells, 1996) 
 
In turn, inappropriate intonation may yield inadequate higher-level explicatures. 
This results in puzzling understanding, as the hearer misconceives the speaker’s 
intentions or attitude (Yus Ramos, 1999a, 1999b): 
 
(5)  [Said by a waiter at a self-service restaurant when asking a diner whether he wanted 
sauce]: `Gravy [Falling instead of rising intonation made the offer sound as an order] 
(From Tannen, 1984) 
 
Translation of paralinguistic strategies may also induce hearers to reach 
alternative implicatures (Yus Ramos, 1999a, 1999b). These become detrimental 
if hearers misattribute unwarranted intentions to speakers (Escandell Vidal, 
1998). For instance, during an internship as a hotel receptionist, a Spanish 
student of English for the Tourism Industry was unduly perceived as rude 
because of requestive strategies like those in (6): 
 
(6)   
a. Give me your ID. [In Spanish the imperative mood frequently signals requests] 
b. Can you give me your ID? [Instead of ‘Can/could/may I have your ID?’] 
c. Do you give me your passport/ID? [Direct translation of ‘¿Me da(s) su/tu DNI? 
 
Inappropriate expressive choices may also be motivated by speakers’ 
egocentrism, which prevents them from taking into account hearers’ 
perspectives and, hence, how they might interpret what is said (Keysar and 
Henly, 2002; Keysar, 2007; Kecskes and Zhang, 2009). By solely relying on 
their knowledge, beliefs or desires, speakers think that their informative 
intention is clear enough and refrain from investing the necessary cognitive 
effort to consider other more efficient formulations (Todd et al., 2011: 134). This 
is what happened to a Spanish landlady who narrated a series of events to an 
American student:  
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(7)  Pues estaba hablando con la dependienta y entra Pablo. Bueno, y va y me pregunta si me 
quedaba bien la talla. Y entonces le pregunto si había hablado ya con Marta y si habían 
quedado ya para después, para las copas.  
‘So I was talking with the shop-assistant, and Paul walks in and (Ø subject = ‘she’, the 
shop-assistant) asks me if the size fits. And then I ask (indirect object pronoun for both 
masculine and feminine [him = Paul]) if (Ø subject = ‘he’, Paul) had already talked 
to Marta and if (Ø subject = ‘they’, Paul and Marta) had made plans for later, to grab 
drinks.’  
 
Although everything was clear to the landlady, the student could not understand 
correctly whom or what was alluded to because of pronoun dropping in Spanish 
and lack of gender distinction in the third person singular pronominal form for 
the indirect object. 
Speakers’ performance mistakes are not exclusively responsible for 
misunderstanding. Mutual adjustment is amenable to flaws and may yield 
seemingly relevant, but unintended interpretations. Wrong reference assignment 
(8), disambiguation (9) or conceptual adjustment (10) may result in faulty lower-
level explicatures:3 
 
(8)  [Said in a kitchen where different items of furniture are visible]: Leave the knife here! 
[The hearer leaves it on the table, but the speaker meant on the shelf] 
(9)  They are hunting dogs. [They are [hunting dogs] vs. [They are hunting] [dogs]. 
(10)  Oh, so this is leaving this place! [While driving and looking for a parking space, the 
speaker alluded to a shop changing location; the hearer understood ‘this’ as referring to a 
car that was about to leave a space and adjusted ‘place’ as meaning ‘parking space’] 
 
Culture-specific concepts may also hinder the construction of lower-level 
explicatures (Janicki, 2010; Wierzbicka, 2010). Precisely, vocabulary and jargon 
prevented another American student from understanding an explanation of a 
Holy Week procession in Seville. To him, terms like ‘capataz’ (‘foreman’), 
‘costalero’ (‘float-carrier’) or ‘martillo/llamador’ (‘knocker’), and the action of 
doing a ‘levantá’, were practically undecipherable: 
 
(11)  Y el capataz llama a los costaleros con el martillo o llamador, se ponen debajo de la 
trabajadera, hacen la levantá, la música suena y el paso comienza a andar. 
‘And the foreman calls the float-carriers with the ‘hammer’ or knocker, they place 
themselves under the trabajadera, they raise up the float, the music starts to sound and the 
float starts to move.’  
                                                          
3  See Padilla Cruz (2013a, 2013b) for more examples. 
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4.1.2. Cultural knowledge 
People forge and accumulate an immense pool of cultural metarepresentations 
about reality. Since reality is perceived differently due to accuracy and attuning 
of sensory mechanisms and interpreted on the basis of previous knowledge, 
experience, identity or ideology, those metarepresentations are interpretive and 
their contents vary across individuals. Through speech, behaviours, social 
institutions and emblems, individuals make those metarepresentations public and 
share them, although their contents may be modified, even if minimally 
(Sperber, 1996).  
Some metarepresentations are relatively stable and concern, for instance, 
frequently accepted means to achieve specific goals, usual meanings of 
expressions, expected or proscribed behaviours, etc. Their usefulness favours 
them remaining unquestioned or unchallenged (Mercier and Sperber, 2011: 66). 
They are stored in a domain-specific mechanism: the social categorisation 
system (Barkow et al., 1992), which performs two tasks (Escandell Vidal, 2004): 
 
a. Creating, revising and updating a database about expected or proscribed 
behaviour. 
b. Analysing, categorising and assessing behaviours on the basis of the 
information in the database. 
 
Cultural metarepresentations feed inferential processes, although individuals are 
unaware of those actually supplied as implicated premises (Mercier and Sperber, 
2011: 58).4 Across cultures those metarepresentations evidently vary (Sperber, 
1996; Žegarac, 2009), but individuals often seem to ignore this (Keysar and 
Henly, 2002). They are affected by the common ground fallacy and, therefore, 
believe that their interlocutors access the same cultural knowledge (Mustajoki, 
2012: 228-229). This complicates communication, as when the Spanish landlady 
explained the procession to the American student (11): she thought that, after 
having been in Seville for months, the student would already know how floats 
move, what float-carriers do, the music played by the band, etc. 
Difference in or lack of cultural knowledge result in alternative implicatures 
or missing implicatures (Yus Ramos, 1999a, 1999b). Practitioners in 
intercultural and cross-cultural pragmatics have extensively documented 
misunderstanding due to behaviours assigned differing values by individuals 
belonging to diverse cultures (Padilla Cruz, 2013a). This is why the (excessive) 
indirectness of Polish or Hebrew requests is sometimes perceived as impolite 
(Blum-Kulka, 1992; Wierzbicka, 1991), the mitigation of requests through 
positive-politeness strategies by Uruguayans sounds rude to British interlocutors 
who prefer negative politeness (Márquez-Reiter, 1997), negative-politeness 
strategies used by some Eastern children to mitigate is often perceived as 
                                                          
4  Inferential processes wherein individuals are unconscious of the beliefs fed are intuitive, while 
those wherein they are aware of them are reflective (Sperber 1997; Mercier and Sperber 2011). 
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overpolite (Ide, 1989; Kataoka, 1995) or small talk may be interpreted as 
intrusive (Reynolds, 1995). 
 
4.1.3. Cognitive systems 
Growth and experience determine styles or patterns of thinking, some of which 
may even be group- or culture-specific. People create distinct connections 
between or shortcuts to information, and access to it depends on attention and/or 
memory activation. Although the manifest physical environment, mutual, factual 
and encyclopaedic knowledge, non-verbal behaviour and previous stretches of 
discourse are likely to make up an initial interpretive context (Yus Ramos, 
2000), the same information may not be actually manifest to different 
individuals. Unawareness of specific information may result in differing or 
missing implicatures (Yus Ramos, 1999a, 1999b). 
Not realising that the melted chocolate topping on his waffle was dripping 
made an American student miss the intended implicature (13) in (12), as his 
reply evidences. His interpretation of his interlocutor’s remark as a token of 
appreciation was also motivated by inability to understand the polysemy of the 
verb ‘ponerse’ (‘getting dirty’, ‘pig out’): 
 
(12)  A: ¡Anda, cómo te estás poniendo! 
‘Gosh, you are getting it all over yourself!’ 
B: ¡Oh, sí! ¡Mi waffle está muy bueno! ¡Sí! ¡Muy bueno! 
‘Oh, yeah! My waffle is delicious! Yeah! Delicious!’ 
(13)  
a. The chocolate topping on your waffle is dripping. 
b. Your trousers are getting dirty. 
c. You are getting stains on your trousers. 
d. You should put a napkin under your waffle. 
 
Another American student, who was lying under the sun on the Faculty grass 
while skipping a class, also failed to grasp the reproach (15) hidden in his 
interlocutor’s comment (14). Since the morning invited to anything but to 
attending class, his response suggests that he derived alternative implicatures 
like those in (16) as a consequence of having activated a mental frame wherein a 
gorgeous sunny morning is associated with what he was doing: 
 
(14)  A: ¡Vaya mañanita nos estamos pegando! Se está ahí bien en el césped, ¿no? 
‘Wow, you’re having a gorgeous morning! It’s nice there on the grass, isn’t it?’ 
B: Oh, sí, sí, muy bien, sí. 
‘Oh, yeah! Very nice, yeah!’ 
(15)  You should be in class.  
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(16)  
e. I would also do that in these circumstances. 
f. I would love to join you. 
 
4.2. Unstable factors 
 
Other factors are likelier to vary across individuals and situations (Mustajoki, 
2012: 224-226). Some of them have a sociocultural nature, while others are 
connected with the interlocutors’ occasional states or actions. 
 
4.2.1.  Personal relationships 
Social proximity emerges from companionship in shared activities and 
experiences, services and goods provided, concern shown for others, self-
disclosure in discussions of personal ideas, opinions or confidences, or 
expression of sentiments (Hays, 1984). Low social distance (Brown and 
Levinson, 1987) may correlate with similarities in terms of knowledge because 
of high frequency of contact, familiarity or affect (Spencer-Oatey, 1996: 7).  
Knowing each other involves getting and being used to ways of speaking and 
meaning. Speakers familiarised with their hearers assume that they can speak in 
specific ways or omit certain information because hearers may possess the 
knowledge needed for correct understanding. Indeed, hearers often succeed at 
inferring informative intentions because they repeatedly adjust words, 
disambiguate or pragmatically enrich expressions in a particular manner; are 
used to particular facial expressions and body movements, or can foresee 
expected premises. In intercultural contexts where contact is infrequent or 
established for the first time, there may obviously be knowledge differences 
leading to unacquaintance with ways of speaking. 
Frequency of contact and familiarity, nonetheless, do not always favour 
mutual understanding. Envy, quarrels, anger or indifference may impede the 
construction of explicatures, bring to the fore assumptions that yield unwanted 
conclusions or block access to those necessary to draw expected conclusions. 
This was the case of two friends who, despite having got along well for more 
than a decade, were not on very good terms at a certain moment. They had made 
arrangements for their group of friends’ yearly Christmas dinner and had already 
decided when but not where to have it. They ran into each other and one of them 
cunningly asked the rather ambiguous question in the first turn of (17) in order 
to find out if the other was willing to offer his house as the venue for the dinner. 
The latter failed to conveniently enrich the question and understood it as a 
question about his plans for Christmas, as his response and subsequent talk 
show. Moreover, he did not narrow ‘the dinner’ as referring to ‘their group 
dinner’:  
 Interlocutors-Related and Hearer-Specific Causes of Misunderstanding 23 
 
(17)  A: Bueno, bueno, bueno, ¡pero que Navidad está aquí ya! ¿Tú ya tienes claro 
qué vas a hacer? 
‘Oh, my God! Christmas is almost here! Do you already know 
what you’re going to be doing?’ 
B: Bueno, son fechas complicadas, de mucho ajetreo. Aún tengo 
que atar unos cuantos cabos. 
‘Well, these are complicated dates, with a lot of hustle and bustle.  
I’ve still got to tie up some loose ends.’ 
A: Ya, claro. Bueno, ¿y para la cena? 
‘Yea, sure. And for the dinner?’ 
B: Nada, tío; la cena en familia. 
‘Nothing, man; dinner with my family.’ 
A: Me refiero a la nuestra. 
‘I mean our dinner.’ 
B: ¡Ah, vale! Mejor nos vamos a tomar algo en la calle. 
‘Oh! It’d be better to go grab something somewhere.’ 
 
Social hierarchies, along which people occupy diverse positions, may be culture-
specific and generate expectations about what is permitted or unacceptable. 
Although distance from higher-status individuals may correlate with indifference 
in some cultures, superiors are sometimes felt close and liked in others – 
depending, obviously, on personal traits. Closeness, however, does not always 
entail smooth relationships (Padilla Cruz, 2005). Bosses, managers or employees 
in some countries have specific expectations about how utterances should be 
understood and their identities determine how utterances are actually 
understood. This is what happened to the Spanish boss of an Italian employee 
when uttering (18): 
 
(18)  Convendría que sacaras, comprobaras y colocaras el pedido en algún momento. 
‘It would be nice if you took out, checked and stored the orders at some point.’ 
 
The employee did not understand ‘en algún momento’ as meaning 
‘immediately’, which the boss used together with the conditional for the sake of 
considerateness. Consequently, the boss reprimanded the employee before the 
afternoon shift for not having done any of those tasks. 
 
4.2.2.  Psychological/physiological states and actions related to physiological 
functions 
It is virtually impossible not to be affected by certain psychological or 
physiological states and/or actions performed in physiological functions. 
Feelings like happiness, euphoria, sorrow, sadness, melancholy, anger, wrath, 
surprise, astonishment or puzzlement, and states like illness, tiredness, boredom, 
absent-mindedness, drunkenness, drowsiness or depression, jointly or separately, 
influence how people speak and understand. These feelings and states may 
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lessen the interlocutors’ cognitive abilities and impede the formulation of 
messages, identification of manifest contextual elements and/or mutual 
adjustment. Moreover, actions motivated by physiological functions like 
swallowing, sipping, gulping or sneezing may cause fluency problems that 
hinder expression or distract hearers. Emotional overdrive may even condition 
interlocutors’ preferences (Mustajoki, 2012: 229), particularly in emergency 
situations, where speakers excessively concentrate on the message and may 
ignore its form and what this may inadvertently and unintentionally 
communicate, and hearers may adjust explicit and implicit import erroneously. 
A serious argument had made two Spanish close friends very angry at each 
other. Some days after the argument, they had to buy a present for a mutual 
friend’s recently born baby. Over the phone, A suggested to look for the present 
on a particular afternoon, but B had already made plans and said: 
 
(19)  B: Estoy por el centro ahora mismo. Puedo pasar por alguna tienda y veo algo. 
‘I am in the city centre right now. I can pop into some shops and have a look.’ 
 
Although B’s intention was be helpful, A misunderstood his offer because he 
thought that popping into shops and having a look implied definitely buying the 
present. His response unveils that he associated mutual anger with reluctance to 
be involved in any joint activity, which made A misattribute the intention to buy 
the present to B: 
 
(20)  ¡Ni se te ocurra comprar nada! ¡No, no! ¡No sin que yo lo vea! ¡Pero vamos! ¿Tú qué te 
crees, que vas a comprar lo que te dé la gana? ¡Ni hablar! ¡No, no, no! Vamos los dos 
juntos y vemos lo que sea, que capaz eres de comprar cualquier mamarrachada. 
‘Don’t even think about buying something! No, no! Not without me seeing it! Hey, man! 
What are you thinking? Buying whatever you feel like? No way! Absolutely not! The two 
of us will go together and have a look because you could easily just buy any old 
monstrosity.’ 
 
Psychological states may bias individuals to access idiosyncratic or cultural 
frames where some actions or behaviours are assigned very specific values. If 
such frames vary across cultures and individuals, access to them may turn out 
troublesome. Similarly, actions involved in physiological functions may 
complicate uttering and comprehension. When a lingua franca that is not fully 




5. Additional hearer-related causes of misunderstanding 
 
Impeded interpretive abilities may certainly result in undesired interpretations 
accidentally achieving an optimal level of relevance (Wilson, 1999) and, hence, 
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appearing acceptable. The processing strategy deployed, a tendency to preserve 
interpretative hypotheses, and insufficient vigilance to the appropriateness of 
those interpretations may additionally cause hearers to trust erroneous 
interpretations. 
 
5.1. Processing strategy 
 
Hearers follow the path of least effort and maximum benefit and stop upon 
finding interpretative hypotheses satisfying their expectations of relevance 
(Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Sperber, 2002, 2004). This procedure is naïve 
optimism (Sperber, 1994), a simple and commonsense processing strategy that is 
almost automatically deployed (Padilla Cruz, 2012). A naïvely optimistic hearer 
presupposes not only the speaker’s benevolence and competence, but also his 
own competence as an interpreter. 
Unfortunately, naïve optimism may not lead to the actual informative 
intention. The psycho-physiological factors discussed may cause expressive or 
interpretive mistakes conducive to unintended interpretations that may 
accidentally achieve optimal relevance (Wilson, 1999). Regardless of whether it 
is the speaker or the hearer’s fault, reaching an interpretation that appears 
optimally relevant suffices for (unknowingly) believing it to be intended and, 
therefore, to accept it as the informative intention. Naïve hearers do not consider 
the possibility that expressive or interpretive mistakes happen. They simply 
engage in the relevance-driven heuristics, construct interpretative hypotheses 
and accept them without questioning their plausibility.  
Deployment of naïve optimism may explain misunderstandings like those in 
(12), (14), (17) and (19, 20): hearers took for granted their interlocutors’ or their 
own appropriate performance, relied on erroneous interpretative hypotheses that 
accidentally achieved optimal relevance and did not wonder whether other 
interpretations were possible. In intercultural communication, naïve and 
optimistic hearers may not question the correctness of, for example, conceptual 
adjustment (12) or the appropriateness of contextual assumptions supplied as 
implicated premises (14), above all if these have a cultural status. However, 
failure to detect expressive or interpretive mistakes and persevering in the 
(wrong) belief that a particular interpretation is intended are motivated by 
additional cognitive factors. 
 
5.2. Confirmation bias 
 
Interpretative hypotheses depend on the evidence for the informative intention 
and reasonably effortless, allegedly correct and satisfactorily effect-yielding 
mutual adjustment. They are ultimately accepted because of a cognitive 
tendency to “[…] hang on to […] favoured hypotheses with unwarranted 
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tenacity and confidence” (Klayman, 1995: 385): confirmation bias. 5  This 
tendency makes hearers persevere in the beliefs that (i) the evidence for the 
informative intention is appropriate, and (ii) they carried out mutual adjustment 
correctly, so they retain an interpretative hypothesis and trust it.  
The mind is always limited as regards the tasks it performs and the heuristics 
it deploys. Hearers rely on a particular hypothesis and consider it correct if it 
does not require much effort (Friedrich, 1993: 298), there is available or easily 
accessible supporting evidence (Kunda, 1999: 94) and the hypothesis seems a 
reasonable output of cognitive processes (Nickerson, 1998: 198-200). 
Confirmation bias inclines hearers to “believe too much” in (linguistic) 
information backing up a certain hypothesis and in their cognitive skills, above 
all if they easily perceive that information and can construct a hypothesis. 
Consequently, they feel reluctant to discard it (Klayman, 1995: 385-386). 
Immediate access to candidate referents, easy and (seemingly) logical 
disambiguation, straightforward recovery of elided material or clear perception 
of paralanguage evidencing particular attitudes, feelings or speech acts may bias 
hearers to assume that the results of these tasks are error-free and to accept them 
as correct. As naïve hearers, they do not suspect that there could be other 
outputs, but think that they performed them aright. This is what made the hearer 
of (5) automatically interpret the waiter’s falling intonation as an order and the 
hearer of (8) place the knife on the table instead of on the shelf. 
Confirmation bias may also make hearers retain conclusions about 
communicative behaviours derived from information available in the database of 
the social categorisation system. When that information does not exactly match 
the one that actually caused those behaviours, the system tends to interpret them 
on the basis of the unchallenged information it stores (Nickerson, 1998: 175). 
Accordingly, the system selects those items enabling it to make sense out of the 
behaviours in question and constructs some sort of logical argument that agrees 
with existing (cultural) beliefs or previous expectations (Mercier and Sperber, 
2011: 63-64). Thus, the unexpected indirectness in some Hebrew or Polish 
speakers’ requests or the mitigating positive-politeness strategies used by 
Uruguayans failed to achieve their intended purpose because their interlocutors 
blindly stuck to interpretations thereof based on the information about 
indirectness or such strategies stored in the database of their social categorisation 
system and did not question its appropriateness. 
 
5.3. Weak vigilance 
 
The complexity and speed of mutual parallel adjustment make it potentially 
liable to flaws or mistakes. While some of them may stem from the suitability 
and quality of the information employed, others may be due to how such 
adjustment is made. If mistakes and flaws go unnoticed, mutual adjustment 
                                                          
5 This is also alluded to as perseverance of belief or hypothesis preservation (Klayman 1995). 
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yields wrong interpretations that may seem plausible. Misunderstandings then 
arise when hearers unquestioningly rely on its output and unknowingly accept 
erroneous interpretations. Reliance on such hypotheses may be motivated by 
lack of vigilance of either the quality of the information employed – epistemic 
vigilance (Mascaro and Sperber, 2009; Sperber et al., 2010) – or the inferential 
tasks involved in mutual adjustment – hermeneutical vigilance (Padilla Cruz, 
2014, 2015, 2016). 
 
5.3.1. Epistemic vigilance  
Interpretations are contingent on information coming from sources like 
perception or dispensed testimony. Individuals are therefore interested in using 
genuine information with a view to avoiding misinformation and/or deception. 
Information is filtered out on the basis of its truthfulness and informers are 
sorted out in terms of their reliability. This is possible thanks to a complex set of 
mechanisms that focus precisely on the quality of information and its various 
sources, and assess them as regards their credibility and infallibility.  
As part of the human genetic endowment, those mechanisms generate an 
alertness to the possibility of being deceived or misinformed, and trigger a 
critical attitude towards information and informers: epistemic vigilance 
(Mascaro and Sperber, 2009; Sperber et al., 2010). This is essential to avoid 
blind, uncritical and naïve gullibility (Sperber et al., 2010: 363; Mercier and 
Sperber, 2011; Sperber and Mercier, 2012), as a result of which individuals are 
prone to indiscriminately believe anybody or any item of information, regardless 
of its source and availability of supporting evidence, or to regard information 
that even contradicts previous personal observation as true (Clément et al., 2004: 
361-363). Epistemic vigilance creates the scepticism or caution necessary to 
preclude deception or acquisition of erroneous information; it is an ability 
enabling people to calibrate their trust in individuals and information 
(Mazzarella, 2015: 185). 
Epistemic vigilance mechanisms evaluate the potential relevance of 
information, its coherence with information that is already stored, support or 
available evidence for its believability (Sperber et al., 2010: 374; Mazzarella, 
2015: 187). They also take into account various factors determining trust 
allocation, such as beliefs about other people, their reputation, moral 
commitments or signals connected with competence or knowledge, like 
assertiveness, certainty, hesitation, nervousness, gaze direction, eye contact, etc. 
(Origgi, 2013: 224). On average, these mechanisms are moderately activated and 
fulfil their functions satisfactorily. However, they may be weakly activated 
because of allocation of cognitive effort to other tasks, or strongly activated if 
risks of deception or misinformation are detected. The stronger their activation, 
the likelier misinformation and deception can be avoided (Michaelian, 2013; 
Sperber, 2013).  
Raising the activation of vigilance mechanisms involves introspection and 
self-awareness of a series of external and internal factors. Among the former are 
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cultural norms determining trust in types of people or information about states of 
affairs, while among the latter are emotional reactions and biases towards people 
and states of affairs. Thus, individuals can trace the reasons for believing people 
or information and estimate the consequences that result from trusting them. 
Weak vigilance or not exercising vigilance at all may also cause 
misunderstanding, as individuals may rely on inadequate beliefs to process 
utterances or on beliefs whose truthfulness is not duly proved. If those beliefs 
are supplied as premises, its wrongness or inaccuracy leads to wrong or 
inappropriate conclusions. Misunderstanding, then, may be due to failure to 
detect such inaccuracy or wrongness, correct it or look for more adequate 
information. In the case of the hearer of (14), believing that the speaker would 
love to be doing the same made him miss the intended reprimand. Had he 
realised the time and that his interlocutor did not actually believe that lying 
under the sun was probably the best thing to do while a class was taking place, 
he might have reacted otherwise. Likewise, the irate response (20) by the hearer 
of (19) was certainly motivated by having unquestioningly taken for granted 
idiosyncratic or culture-related beliefs referring to his interlocutor’s 
unwillingness to go shopping with him, avoid meeting him or take into account 
his opinion about candidate presents because of their previous argument. If the 
hearer had questioned such beliefs, he might have interpreted (19) as a sincere 
offer to simply have a look at possible presents in order to speed up the search. 
 
5.3.2. Hermeneutical vigilance 
Raising vigilance also involves introspection and awareness of the heuristics 
deployed when drawing conclusions and tracing the beliefs and biases 
originating them. Active vigilance empowers individuals to reconstruct 
inferential steps or interpretative routes in mutual adjustment, so they can 
distinguish valid from erroneous inferences (Origgi, 2013: 226-227). Despite 
risks inherent to the post factum nature of the process (Carruthers, 2009), 
individuals may also bring to consciousness the factors and biases leading them 
to segment, parse and disambiguate input in a particular manner, select 
candidates for referential expressions, adjust concepts, recover elided material, 
construct attitudinal descriptions or supply some implicated premises (Padilla 
Cruz, 2016). 
Vigilance mechanisms could therefore be argued to include a sub-set of 
devices specialised in assessing the plausibility of interpretative hypotheses. 
They trigger an alertness to mistakes in mutual adjustment or more plausible 
outputs thereof, which are not initially considered. Such alertness makes 
individuals scrutinise how they adjusted explicit and implicit content and look 
for flaws or more viable alternatives.6 Since those devices target interpretations 
and aim at avoidance of possible mistakes, they would generate an attitude of 
hermeneutical vigilance (Padilla Cruz, 2014, 2015, 2016). If epistemic vigilance 
                                                          
6  See Padilla Cruz (2016) for evidence adduced from the field of developmental psychology. 
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mechanisms result in a critical attitude towards beliefs and information that 
safeguards individuals from misinformation and deception, hermeneutical 
vigilance causes an alertness to misinterpretation and another critical attitude, 
but to interpretative hypotheses.  
Individuals may also be more or less hermeneutically vigilant depending on 
circumstances, so that weak vigilance may result in interpretive mistakes or 
failure to arrive at intended interpretations. Accordingly, misunderstandings may 
also be caused by scarce or weak activation of hermeneutical vigilance and 
inability to detect either expressive or interpretive infelicities. Weak 
hermeneutical vigilance explains why the hearer in (4) congratulated his 
interlocutor: he did not realise that the speaker’s regional accent made the word 
‘autistic’ sound like ‘artistic’. Similarly, if the hearer of (8) had been more 
hermeneutically vigilant, he would have checked if there was any other place 
where his interlocutor intended him to leave the knife instead of directly 
assuming that he had to leave it on the table. 
 
5.3.3. Consequences of weak vigilance 
Naïve hearers presuppose speakers’ benevolence and competence, as well as 
their own competence. Detection of underperformance rules out those 
presuppositions and incites hearers to consider that speakers might have meant 
something else or that they should have arrived at another interpretation. A 
cautious attitude then emerges towards what is said and understood, which 
empowers hearers to question speakers’ expressive abilities and their own 
interpretive abilities and prompts them to search for other interpretations. This is 
possible thanks to a more sophisticated processing strategy enacted after 
vigilance mechanisms notice expressive mistakes, belief falsity, errors or likelier 
options in mutual parallel adjustment: cautious optimism (Sperber, 1994). 
Cautiously optimistic hearers do not accept seemingly relevant hypotheses. 
Rather, they move to a position of sceptical trust (Clément et al., 2004: 362) 
wherein they discard those hypotheses, undertake additional effort in order to re-
adjust explicit and implicit content by considering distinct alternatives and 
beliefs, and formulate new hypotheses. Thus, hearers can solve misinterpretation 
caused by the speakers’ or their own poor performance, arrive at actual 
informative intention, restore mutual understanding and ultimately avoid 
assuming that speakers sought to deceive or misinform them. Weak vigilance 
may block the enactment of cautious optimism and make misunderstandings 
persist. 
Egocentrism often challenges communication. Speakers avoid or overcome it 
by actively monitoring hearers’ reactions (Clark and Krych, 2004; Mustajoki, 
2012: 226). This requires various (subconscious) acts like noticing if the hearer 
follows or understands. Monitoring depends on theory of mind abilities because 
speakers must reason about the mental operations hearers perform: they have to 
simulate hearers’ mental actions internally in order to detect alleged 
interpretative problems (Perlis et al., 1998: 562; Bekkering et al., 2009; Shintel 
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and Keysar, 2009). Indeed, people mentally represent what their interlocutors 
must be doing at a certain moment, thus aligning themselves with their 
interlocutors (Garrod and Pickering, 2009: 293-294), which facilitates 
anticipation of (re)actions (Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009: 358). The ensuing 
adjustments in speech and paralanguage – e.g. repeating more slowly or loudly, 
rephrasing, paraphrasing, etc. (Clark and Krych, 2004; Berger, 2007) – evidence 
hearer design (Mustajoki, 2012: 227). Monitoring and hearer design make up a 
miscommunication competence, whereby speakers manage misunderstanding, 
negotiate meaning and restore mutual understanding (Perlis et al., 1998: 564). 
The risks inherent to intercultural communication evidently call for the 
development of such competence. 
Hearers’ awareness of competence deficits or underperformance is also 
necessary to manage and solve misunderstandings. Since smooth communication 
requires abilities to detect and repair expressive and interpretative failures (Perlis 
et al., 1998: 564), epistemic and hermeneutical vigilance, together with cautious 
optimism, may also be considered indispensable components of 
miscommunication competence: while the two forms of vigilance facilitate 
detection of mistakes, cautious optimism aims at repairing them. In the hearer, 
confirmation bias favours the acceptance of apparently relevant interpretations, 
while egocentrism precludes estimates of speakers’ mental states. These two 
factors cause some meta-blindness, or “recalcitrant ignorance” (Medina, 
2011: 29), about other minds and the performance of his own mind (Kecskes, 
2010: 56).  
Hearers overcome such meta-blindness when they behave as cautious 
individuals. As such, they deploy meta-reasoning and meta-linguistic skills that 
enable them to create some sort of conversation history where they bring back to 
consciousness what was said and how they interpreted it, and to wonder which 
other interpretation might be more adequate. This generates some sort of 
epistemic and/or hermeneutical friction between the initial interpretation and the 
alternative one, which is essential for a mistaken interpretation not to be retained 
and, therefore, for misunderstanding not to persist. Cautious optimism, then, is a 
form of active logic (Miller and Perlis, 1993) fostering abandonment of 
interpretative hypotheses in favour of others. Thanks to this, hearers can also 
align themselves with the speakers by considering what they might have meant 
and contribute to restoring mutual understanding. Not deploying it may hence 
render the restoration of mutual understanding a more complicate endeavour or 
even an ordeal, above all in intercultural contexts where interlocutors differ in 
terms of cultural knowledge, the impact of feelings on access to specific 
assumptions or frames, ways of speaking or adjusting explicit and implicit 
content, etc.  




The stable and unstable factors identified by Mustajoki (2012) may also impact 
comprehension and make hearers fail to infer their interlocutors’ informative 
intention. Three further cognitive factors may cause hearers to erroneously 
assign plausibility and credibility to interpretative hypotheses: an easy and 
simple processing strategy, confirmation bias and weak vigilance of either 
beliefs used or of the output of inferential processes. These factors, in addition to 
optimal relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995), also play a crucial role in 
comprehension by determining the acceptance of interpretative hypotheses. 
These additional hearer-specific factors may be interrelated. For instance, 
deployment of naïve optimism may correlate with low levels of vigilance and 
with an almost automatic tendency to take for granted the plausibility of 
interpretative hypotheses appearing optimally relevant, which precludes possible 
checks for mistakes or erroneous or inaccurate beliefs. In turn, weak epistemic 
or hermeneutical vigilance may result in failure to detect infelicitous 
interpretations and block the enactment of cautious optimism. Also, 
confirmation bias may be connected with the strength and usefulness assigned to 
one’s own cultural information or with lack of access to the speaker’s cognitive 
environment. Future research could look into the circumstances wherein 
vigilance mechanisms are activated or their activation increases, as well as into 
the external and internal factors that foster their activation. It would also be 
illuminating to analyse the connections between the quality of cultural 
information and awareness of the other person’s cultural information and 
confirmation bias. Moreover, it would shed much light to examine if a high 
degree of confirmation bias conditions the type of vigilance that hearers exercise 
or if stronger vigilance has some effect on confirmation bias as a consequence of 
attempts to discover possible false beliefs or mistakes in mutual adjustment and, 
hence, to challenge initial interpretations.  
Researchers could also assay the relation between confirmation bias and 
other personal characteristics to other personal characteristics, such as 
stubbornness, ego boundaries – i.e. potential openness or closeness to external 
influences and unknown situations (Hartman, 1991; Ehrman, 1999) – or 
tolerance of ambiguity – i.e. the capacity to perceive, understand and react to 
ambiguous and unfamiliar situations and stimuli (Furnham and Ribchester, 
1995). Probably, thick ego boundaries (Ehrman, 1999) and little tolerance of 
ambiguity correlate with higher self-confidence in interpretive tasks and, hence, 
with a stronger inclination to stick to seemingly relevant and correct 
interpretations, weak vigilance and inability or reluctance to question their 
plausibility and to switch to cautious optimism. Finally, since cautious optimism 
may be triggered by strong vigilance as a way to overcome misinterpretation, 
further research could also explore if the deployment of this strategy has any 
influence on the amount of meaning negotiation necessary from interlocutors in 
order to restore mutual understanding once misunderstanding is noticed.  
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